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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JACK ALDON HEWITT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE GENERAL TIRE AND Case No. 8502 
RUBBER COMPANY, a corpor-
ation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the Statment of Facts 
set forth in Appellant's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF POINT UPON WHICH 
RESPONDENT RELIES 
The appellant is not entitled to interest on the 
verdict returned by the jury on April 23, 1953, until 
paid. 
ARGUMENT 
At the conclusion of the evidence at the trial 
of the above-entitled cause, defendant moved for a 
directed verdict. The motion was not immediately 
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ruled upon but was withheld pending the jury's 
verdict. The verdict was for the plaintiff, whereupon 
defendant moved for judgment in its favor notwith-
standing the verdict, which motion was granted. 
The mere fact that the clerk entered a judgment on 
the verdict before the court had ruled on the motion 
for a directed verdict and before the court granted 
the motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict could, of course, be of no avail to the plaintiff. 
The clerk, performing a ministerial act, could give 
no validity to the verdict during the period that the 
court had reserved its ruling-that is, while it had 
the defendant's motion under advisement - nor 
could the clerk's judgment be of any validity as 
against the ruling of the court giving judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
Now the real question is: From what date 
was the plaintiff entitled to interest upon the judg-
ment which the Supreme Court, in reversing the 
trial court, ordered to be entered on the verdict? 
Plaintiff claims he should receive interest from the 
date of the verdict while defendant contends that it 
is the date the judgn1ent in favor of the plaintiff 
was actually entered from which interest should 
be computed. 
Counsel for plaintiff considers the question 
settled by Rule 54-E of the Rules of Civil Procedure 
which provides: 
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" (e) The clerk must include in any 
judgment signed by him any interest on the 
verdict or decision from the time it was ren-
dered, and the costs, if the same have been 
taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, within 
two days after the costs have been taxed or 
ascertained, in any case where not included 
in the judgment, insert the amount thereof 
in a blank left in the judgment for that pur-
pose, and make a similar notation thereof in 
the Register of Actions and in the Judgment 
Docket.'' 
It will be noted that this rule directs the clerk 
to include in any judgment signed by him "interest 
on the verdict or decision from the time it was 
rendered". This rule flies in the face of our statute, 
Section 15-1-4, which provides: 
"Any judgment rendered on a lawful 
contract shall conform thereto and shall bear 
the interest agreed upon by the parties, which 
shall be specified in the judgment; other judg-
ments shall bear interest at the rate of eight 
per cent per ann urn.'' 
As the statute provides that "other judgments 
shall bear interest at the rate of B7o per annum" 
there can be no interest for a judgment to bear until 
the judgment is entered. The Enabling Act for the 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the rules 
"may not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive 
rights of any litigant", and Rule 54-E, which at-
tempts to authorize the clerk to "include in any 
judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict 
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or decision from the time it was rendered" is an 
enlargement of the rights of the plaintiff and is 
to that extent a nullity. 
Counsel cites a number of cases which he claims 
justify his contention that interest should be com-
puted from the date of the verdict, but when ex-
amined none of them support him. In Bond v. United 
States Railroad (Cal.) (Pltfs. Br. P. 3) 113 P.2d 
366 the statute expressly directs that "the clerk 
must include in the judgment entered up by him 
any interest on the verdict or decision of the court 
from the date it was rendered". This is the same 
provision contained in our Rule 54-E and the case is 
not authority for the construction of our statute. 
The same is true of the other California cases cited 
at PP-4-5 of plaintiff's brief. In the case of Metcalf 
v. City of Watertown, 68 F. 859, (Applts. Br. P. 6) 
a Wisconsin statue provided for interest from the 
date of the verdict. In Louisiana and Arkansas Ratl-
way Company v. Pratt, 142 F. 2d 847 (Applts. Br. 
P. 6) the court held it was proper to allow interest 
from the date of the verdict because Section 966 
Revised Statute authorized it to be done. In Givens 
v. Missouri-Kansas etc. Railroad, 196 F. 2d 905 
( Applts. Br. PP-8-9) the court expressly relies on 
the case of Louisiana et. Railway Co. v. Pratt and 
allows interest from the date of the verdict presum-
ably for the same reason given by the court in that 
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case, and in Wright v. Paramount Richards Theaters, 
Inc., 198 F. 2d 303 (Applts. Br. P. 11) the Givens 
case is relied on as authority. These Federal cases 
therefore are really based upon Section 966 which 
authorizes the computation of interest from the date 
of the verdict. The last case cited by counsel, Y arno 
v. Hedlund, etc. Co. (Cal.) 237 P. 1002 (Applts. Br. 
P. 12) is not authority in this case because, as before 
stated, the California statute expressly directs that 
interest be computed from the date of the verdict. 
Let us now call the court's attention to authori-
ties that are in point. As before stated, Utah has no 
statute which allows interest from the date of the 
verdict in a personal injury case, and Rule 54-E, 
cannot confer a right to interest from that date. 
The statute controls the rule and interest can only 
be computed from the date of the judgment. 
The allowance of interest is purely a statutory 
matter. It can make no difference that there is a 
delay between the date of the verdict and the date 
of the entry of the judgment, for a defendant has 
a right at all stages to contest the validity or amount 
of the verdict, and the mere fact that the plaintiff is 
unable to collect the amount of his verdict because 
of proceedings on appeal or otherwise, does not con-
fer upon him any right to claim interest from the 
date the verdict is rendered, and this is especially 
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true when the verdict is set aside, or its effective-
ness suspended, as in this case. Here there was 
neither verdict nor judgment for the plaintiff until 
the Supreme Court reinstated the verdict and or-
dered judgment thereon. This question of the right 
to interest has been before many courts and it has 
been repeatedly held that where the statute does 
not expressly allow interest to be computed from 
the date of the verdict, interest is not allowable from 
such date. 
"Where plaintiff recovers a verdict for 
slander and a motion for new trial was not 
disposed of until the following term, when it 
was overruled and judgment entered on the 
verdict; held : the trial court erred in adding 
interest from the date of the verdict to the 
date of the judgment since the recovery was 
not on a claim bearing interest and there was 
no statutory authority for interest on ver-
dicts.'' 
Blickenstaff v. Perrin, 27 Ind. 527; Atherton 
v.Fowler, 46 Calif. 320; Clyde Mill and Elevator Co. 
v. Buoy (Kansas) 80 P. 591; Baltimore City etc. R.R. 
Co. v. Sewell, 37 Md. 443; Kelsey v. Murphy, 30 Pa. 
340. 
In every one of the above states in which said 
decisions were rendered, a later statute was passed 
directing the computation of interest from the date 
of the verdict and there are therefore a number of 
cases from each of said states wherein interest from 
such date was allowed, based upon said statute. 
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The reasons for the disallowance of interest 
from the date of the verdict, in the absence of a 
statute, are well stated in the note to I ALR (2), 
Page 493: 
"In Baltimore City Pass. R. Co. v. Sewell 
( 1873) 37 Md. 443, after a verdict for the 
plaintiff, the defendant filed motions for a 
new trial and in arrest of judgment which 
were subsequently overruled, and on appeal 
the overruling of the motions was affirmed. 
On remand, the trial court, on motion of the 
plaintiff, entered judgment for the amount 
of the verdict with interest from the date of 
the verdict, and the defendant appealed, con-
tending that interest could run only from the 
date of the judgment. After reviewing the 
common-law principles and previous decisions 
the court said: 'The verdict being an inter-
mediate step in the progress of litigation, 
liable to be suspended or annulled by the sub-
sequent action of the Court, it does not seem 
to us consistent with judicial deliberation that 
the delay occasioned by motions for a new 
trial, or in arrest of judgment (although such 
motions should be ultimately overruled) 
should be made the occasion of an increase of 
damages, by way of interest, on the presump-
tion that such motions were groundless, and 
without cause. The motion for a new trial, or 
in arrest, is a valuable and necessary incident 
to the right of trial by jury, and no restraint 
should be placed upon it inconsistent with 
its freest exercise. The Court cannot assume 
that in the exercise of a legal right, any party 
to a cause is actuated by sinister motives.' 
The judgment was reversed ,as to the interest 
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accruing between the date of the verdict and 
entry of the judgment, and the cause remand-
ed for modification in that respect. (But see 
Hodgson v. Phippin ( 1930) 159 Md. 97, 150 
A. 118, infra, Sec. 10, decided under a later 
statute expressly authorizing interest from 
date of verdict.) 
"In reversing an order of the trial court 
allowing interest from the date of the verdict 
after affirmance of a judgment for the plain-
tiff, entry of which had been delayed some 
eleven months by pendency of the defendant's 
motions in arrest of judgment and for a new 
trial, in Kelsey v. Murphy (1858) 30 Pa. 340, 
the court stated that from the definitions of 
interest, differing but little in essentials, two 
things must necessarily pre-exist to raise the 
duty on the part of the debtor to discharge 
his debt, namely, the ascertainment of the 
amount to be paid, and its maturity. The court 
then said: 'If these essentials are wanting, the 
debt, although existing, cannot be said to be 
due and withheld, and the duty to pay has not 
become imperative upon the debtor. Unliqui-
dated demands, past due, will, if otherwise 
entitled, bear interest, upon the maxim of id 
certum est quod certum reddi potest. They 
can be rendered certain. But while the ques-
tion of indebtedness, under all the ascertained 
facts in the case is under consideration in the 
courts, as is the case on a motion for a new 
trial, the con tract of the debtor is suspended. 
The case is in gremio legis, and is presumed 
to be held under consideration by the minis-
ters of the law. The debtor can neither pay, 
nor tender, so as to avail anything, even if 
disposed to abandon the contest. It is em-
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phatically, and intruth, the 'law's delay' ... 
While, therefor, the very essence of the con-
test is being considered, and the result is in 
dubio, it is easy to see, that no duty rests upon 
the party ultimately liable to pay, as long as 
that condition lasts, and of course he ought 
not to be obliged to make com pen sa tion to the 
opposite party, because it exists and continues 
for a time. That the proceeding is still im-
mature, when a verdict is rendered, is ap-
parent, when we consider that it is in a con-
dition on which no process can issue, and on 
which no action can be maintained, and is 
no lien on either real or personal estate. For 
these and other reasons, neither the common 
law of England, nor the practice there, or 
with us, have sanctioned the collection of in-
terest as incidental to a verdict during the 
pendency of a motion for a new trial. 
"In Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. 
Berry ( 1895) 55 Kan. 186, 40 P. 288, the 
trial court, refusing to receive and enter the 
jury's general verdict for the plaintiff, di-
rected a general verdict for the defendant 
upon which it entered judgment. The judg-
ment was reversed on appeal and the cause 
remanded with directions that judgment be 
entered for the plaintiff for the amount of the 
verdict, and in entering judgment on the su-
preme court's mandate, the trial court added 
interest from the date of the return of the 
verdict. In modifying the judgment so as to 
eliminate the interest prior to the entry of 
judgment, the supreme court observed that 
while interest on verdicts was expressly al-
lowed by statute in some states it was not in 
Kansas, and that it was unnecessary to de-
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cide whether a verdict bore interest from the 
time of its rendition, holding that since the 
verdict was not recognized or received by the 
trial court until it was done in obedience to the 
mandate of the supreme court, the verdict was 
then for the first time given force and vi-
tality. 
"And in Clyde Mill. & Elev. Co. v. Buoy 
( 1905) 71 Kan. 293, 80 P. 591, wherein, after 
having obtained a verdict, the plaintiff ap-
pealed from an order of the trial court grant-
ing the defendant a new trial, and the order 
of the trial court was reversed with direction 
to enter judgment on the findings and verdict, 
and the trial court entered judgment includ-
ing therein interest on the amount of the ver-
dict up to the date of the judgment, from 
which action the defendant appealed, it was 
held that the allowance of interest upon the 
amount awarded by the verdict from its date 
to the entry of judgment was not authorized 
by the statute (Sec. 3590, General Statutes 
1901) regulating matters of interest. 
"But for Kansas cases under a later 
statute, see infra, Sec. 11. 
"It was held in Campbell v. Elkins 
(1905) 58 W.Va. 308, 52 SE 220, 2 LRA NS 
159, that in a personal injury action wherein 
a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff the 
subsequent rendition of judgment for the 
amount thereof with interest from the date 
of the verdict was in strict obedience to the 
mandate of the statute (Code 1899, c 131, 
Sec. 16) . The court stated: 'Prior to the Acts 
of 1882, Chapter 120, amending certain sec-
tions of the Code, including sections 14 and 
16, this would have been error . . . " 
10 
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"In Easter v. Virginian R. Co. ( 1915) 
76 W. Va. 383, 86 SE 37, a personal injury 
action, in reversing a judgment of the trial 
court entered on a verdict previously rendered 
in favor of the plaintiff and allowing interest 
from the date of the verdict, it was held that 
in tort actions interest runs only from the 
date of the judgment under the statute (Sec. 
18, c 131, Code of 1913, Sec. 4927) providing-
that every judgment or decree for the pay-
ment of money, except where it is otherwise 
provided by law, should bear interest from the 
date thereof, whether or not it is so stated 
in the judgment or decree. The court stated 
that Sec. 14 (Sec. 4923) of the same chapter 
authorizes a judgment for interest from the 
date of the verdict only in case of actions 
founded on contract, and that, the judgment 
in the present case being for a tort, there was 
no authority in law for giving judgment for 
interest, except from the date of the judg-
ment." 
In Hazel E. Briggs, Admrx. etc., of Ralph 
Briggs, deceased v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 
Appt. 154 F (2) 21, the United States Circuit Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit had before it a sta-
tute which provides that interest be caluclated "from 
the date of judgment". The facts of that case as 
outlined in the opinion of the court were: 
" . . . During the trial a motion to dis-
miss the suit for lack of jurisdiction was made 
by the defendant. The court reserved decision 
on the motion and submitted the cause to the 
jury, which, on February 15, 1945, returned 
11 
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a plain tiff's verdict. The motion to dismiss 
was granted, however, on April19, 1945, and 
judgment for the defendant was duly entered. 
We reversed that judgment on January 7, 
1946, and by mandate of January 23, 1946, 
directed that judgment on the verdict for the 
plaintiff be entered. We neither did, nor were 
we requested to, give any directions as to in-
terest. On January 28, 1946, the judgment 
on our mandate was entered for the amount 
of the verdict and for interest from the date 
of the verdict as above stated." 
The court then went on to hold: 
"The remaining question is whether in-
terest should be allowed from the date the 
judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict 
would, in the absence of error in decision, 
have been entered, viz., the date when the ori-
ginal judgment for the defendant was en-
tered by the order of the court; or from J anu-
ary 28, 1946, the date when judgment for 
the plaintiff was actually entered after our 
mandate went down. And if the latter date 
is the correct one, we must decide whether 
we now have any power to amend that man-
date to make the judgment date nunc pro 
tunc that of the original judgment and, if 
so, whether that power ought to be exercised. 
"It is true that subsequent events have 
shown that on the date of the original judg-
ment the plaintiff was entitled to have a 
judgment entered on the verdict and this 
judgment would have borne interest until it 
was paid. But from a practical standpoint, 
it is equally true that the plaintiff then was 
'entitled' only to have the trial judge decide 
12 
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the pending motions and direct the entry of 
such judgment as he fairly determined to be 
lawful and just. That is exactly what the trial 
judge did. Thereafter the plaintiff was 'en-
titled' only to take whatever action by way of 
appellate review the law afforded her. The 
delay in the entry of the proper judgment was 
necessary in the sense that time for appellate 
review was required; it was only after the 
ordinary appellate proceedings had been, com-
pleted that the plaintiff's cause of action had 
reached the point where her right to a judg-
ment on the verdict was judicially established. 
That judgment was then promptly entered. 
The date of its entry became the judgment 
date from which interest is to be computed 
under the statute. It was, under the circum-
stances, the first day when the judgment could 
have been entered." 
Although the case involved the question of 
whether interest should run on the verdict of the 
jury, the reasoning in a Washington case, Kiessling 
v. North West Greyhound Lines, 229 P2 335, is ap-
plicable here. 
"The verdict of the jury was returned 
May 13, 1950. Judgment on the verdict was 
entered July 7, 1950. The court allowed in-
terest on the amount of the verdict from its 
rendition to the entry of judgment. There is 
no statute in this state providing for the 
accrual of interest from the date of a verdict. 
Rem. Rev. Stat. Sec. 457 provides for intrest 
on judgments from the date of entry thereof. 
It is argued that inasmuch as a demand be-
comes liquidated when a verdict is returned, 
the rule that interest commences to run from 
13 
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that time should be applied; also, because 
verdict when entered upon the execution dock-
et as required by Rem. Rev. Stat. Sec. 431-1, 
is in effect a lien upon real property, it must 
follow that interest commences to run from 
the date of verdict. However, in the cases of 
Rood v. Horton, 132 Wash. 82, 231 P. 450 
(Verdict of the jury) and Phifer v. Burton, 
141 Wash. 186, 251 P. 127 (Award by the 
Court) it was decided that interest ran from 
the date of the judgment only. The theory. 
upon which the decisions were based was that 
the demands had not become liquidated until 
the verdict of the jury or award made by the 
court had become merged in the judgment 
thereafter entered. The verdict of a jury or a 
pronouncement of the court determines and 
fixes a definite amount of recovery, but the 
demand is not fully liquidated until the entry 
of judgment for the reason that the court may 
grant a new trial because the award is ex-
cessive or insufficient; or may raise or lower 
the amount and afford the party adversely 
affected the option to accept the same or sub-
mit to a new trial of the case, or, in the case 
of an award by the court, the trial judge 
may change his mind and make a different 
award than included in the original pro-
nouncement. We think the principle involved 
has been settled by Buob v. Frenaughty Mach-
inery Company, 4 Wash. (2) 276, 300, 103 
P ( 2) 325. The case involved a claim for un-
liquidated damages. The court made an award 
of damages, but on appeal the case was re-
manded for further consideration. On the 
second hearing the amount of the damages 
was determined but the court did not make 
any findings or conclusions. Subsequently, 
14 
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findings and conclusions were made and the 
judgment entered thereon, which was the 
third judgment in the case. We held that in-
terest commenced to run from the date of 
the last judgment because until that time the 
amount of damages had never become liqui-
dated. This subject is discussed in the Annota-
tion in 1 A.L.R. ( 2) 492. The author cites 
a number of cases holding that in the absence 
of a statute, interest runs from the date of 
entry of judgment, and not from the date of 
rendition of verdict. The author also points 
out that after several of the cases were so 
decided, the legislatures of the respective 
states enacted statutes providing for interest 
from the rendition of the verdict. We are of 
the opinion that the court erred in entering 
in the judgment interest from the rendition 
of the verdict, which should have allowed 
interest only from the date of judgment." 
In Mundy v. Millsap (Tenn.) 271 S.W. (2) 
857, where a judgment was entered on March 21, 
1952, a motion for a new trial filed on April 3rd 
and the motion overruled on September 6th except 
that a remittitur in the amount of $19.00 was or-
dered, it was held that interest ran from September 
6, the date of judgment was filed after overruling 
the motion for a new trial. 
In State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Koffenberger, 83 NE (2f 916 (Ohio), the court 
entered a nunc pro tunc judgment to carry interest 
from the date of the verdict. The appellate court 
held: 
15 
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"Date from which interest on judgment 
was allowable was controlled by statute, and 
under that interest was allowable only from 
the date of judgment rather than from the 
date of verdict, so that nunc pro tunc entry 
ordering judgment to carry interest from the 
date of the verdict was improper." 
See also the Ohio case of Sewar v. Schmidt, 49 
N.E. (2) 696. 
"Schullin v. Wabash Railway Company 
(1905) 192 Mo. S.W. 1028, the trial court's 
order setting aside a verdict and judgment 
rendered the same day and granting the de-
fendant a new trial was reversed on appeal 
and the case was remanded with directions 
to set aside the order granting a new trial 
and to enter judgment for the plaintiff in ac-
cordance with the verdict. The plaintiff then 
moved to set aside the judgment so entered 
and to enter judgment as of the date of the 
verdict, such motion being overruled, the 
plaintiff appealed, contending that judgment 
should have been entered as of the date when 
the verdict and original judgment were ren-
dered or that the judgment entered pursuant 
to the mandate should have been for the 
amount of the verdict together with interest 
from the date of the verdict ... Pointing out 
that under the statute, all judgments bore 
interest from the time of their rendition un-
less otherwise provided in the judgment, the 
court reasoned that from the time the verdict 
and judgment was rendered and the motion 
to set it aside sustained, it was suspended and 
so remained until judgment was subsequently 
entered pursuant to the Supreme Court man-
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date, and during the interval there really was 
no judgment in favor of the plaintiff which 
could be enforced, for the reason that the 
one which had been rendered in the first in-
stance had been set aside. The court further 
reasoned that if the plaintiff had submitted 
to the ruling of the trial court when it sus-
tained the defendant's motion for a new trial 
and had the case been tried over again, he 
would have had no claim to interest on the 
first judgment in the event of his recovery 
of another verdict, for the reason that it had 
been set aside. The court accordingly held 
that upon reversal of the judgment and the 
remanding of the case with directions to set 
aside the order granting a new trial and enter 
judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with 
the verdict, in the absence of further order 
to enter judgment as of the date of rendition 
of the verdict and original judgment, or to 
enter it for the amount of the verdict with 
interest from the date of rendition, the only 
thing the trial court could do, in acting in 
accordance with the mandate of the Supreme 
Court, was to enter judgment for the plaintiff 
only for the amount of the verdict." 
CONCLUSION 
These cases holding that where a verdict or 
judgment has been set aside, interest does not com-
mence to run until the order setting it aside has 
been reversed and the verdict and judgment rein-
stated, are not only logical, but fair. They are logi-
cal because when a judgment or verdict is set aside, 
there is in reality no judgment which can draw in-
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terest. They are fair because any other holding 
would penalize the party for relying on the judg-
ment of the trial court and would impose upon him 
the risk of the appellate court reversing the trial 
court and then if the trial court was reversed of 
paying the amount of a verdict and being subjected 
to liability for interest because he saw fit to support 
the trial court's decision. 
It might also be said that to allow interest at 
this point is to make the substantive rights of the 
party depend upon the procedure the court adopts. 
To illustrate, the motion for a directed verdict in 
this case was made prior to the time that the case 
was submitted to the jury. Had the court granted 
the motion at that time, there could be no question 
whatsoever that no interest would be due for the 
reason that there would have been no verdict and 
no judgment entered on a verdict. The court, how-
ever, as authorized by the Rules of Civil Procedure, 
took the motion under advisement and in effect, 
granted it after the rendition of the verdict. It is 
submitted that the ruling of the District Court 
should have related back to the time that the motion 
for a directed verdict was made and restored the 
case to that status of no verdict and therefore no 
judgment, as far as the question of interest is con-
cerned. Otherwise, a litigant would be placed in the 
position that interest would run when the court 
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took the motion under advisement and let the matter 
go to the jury, thereafter setting it aside, but would 
not run when the judge granted the motion prior to 
submitting the case to the jury and thereby pre-
vented the rendition of any verdict. 
Respondent respectfully concludes that appel-
lant is not entitled to interest on the verdict entered 
April 23, 1953, until paid, and that the order of 
the District Court should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON AND BALDWIN 
Attorneys for 
Defendant and Respondent 
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